英语读译天天练08

A riddle in a mystery in an enigma  The bond market is supposed to be an intimidating creature. Bill Clinton famously changed his plans for an economic stimulus package because of the likely bond market reaction. The “vigilantes” in the market are supposedly alert to any inflationary threat.  This time round, the bond market has been more pussycat than tiger. Even though many governments have been slipping into deficit, they have been able to borrow at historically low yields, in real and nominal terms. Companies have been able to borrow at very narrow spreads over the cost of government debt.  Furthermore, bond yields have not displayed their usual historical relationship with short rates. The US Federal Reserve has repeatedly raised the cost of borrowing since the summer of 2004. Normally, bond yields would rise in response; instead, they have barely moved at all.  This has represented a problem for the US Federal Reserve. Bond yields are the key component of fixed mortgage rates, widely used by US consumers. So the net effect of all that Fed monetary tightening has not raised mortgage rates at all. Small wonder that the US consumer has kept spending and that house prices have continued to surge ahead.  This year, Alan Greenspan, the Fed chairman, referred to the low level of bond yields as a “conundrum”. There are plenty of investors and strategists, many of whom forecast US bond yields would rise above 5 per cent by the end of 2005, who would agree.  There are a number of potential explanations for the strange reaction of bond markets. The first is that bond investors are still being smart. They are buying bonds at low yields because they believe either that economic growth will be sluggish for some time or that a recession is on the way. A flat or inverted yield curve (when short rates are above long rates) has traditionally been seen as a harbinger of recession.  The problem with this explanation is that few economists are forecasting such a recession and equity markets do not seem to be worrying about it. That requires one to believe in smart bond investors and dumb equity investors, both of whom are often working for the same organisations.  A subtle variant on this argument is that bond markets are not signalling anything about growth at all, they are making a statement about inflation. In a world of competition from Asia, central banks with inflation targets and new technology, inflation will stay low, regardless of the growth outlook. Hence equity investors can be relaxed and bond investors can live with yields of 4 per cent or so.  The alternative explanation is that bond yields are simply wrong. David Miles of Morgan Stanley estimated that real bond yields at the then prevailing levels (in September) would require GDP growth to be permanently below 1.3 per cent a year. That does not seem likely.  So perhaps bond yields are being held artificially low. One possibility is that there is a global savings surplus; too much savings is chasing too few opportunities. The price of saving (the bond yield) has thus fallen. The “culprits” for this excess savings are the Asians, particularly the region’s central banks.  They have recycled their countries’ current account surpluses into dollar securities, holding yields down.  Another possibility is that demographics are keeping bond yields low. Chris Watling of Longview Economics points out that, since 2000, the absolute numbers of 25-44 year olds in the G7 countries has been shrinking.    “This age group exhibits the fastest growth rates of consumption, constitutes most of the first-time buyers of housing and borrows most of the money which is lent to households in an economy.  The 25-44 age group is set to shrink even faster, particularly in European and Japan. In Watling’s view, consumption growth should slow further and real interest rates should trend at low levels for a considerable period.  “A shrinking 25-44 age group therefore lowers natural growth rates of demand.”  Another school of thought blames the Fed for running a cheap money policy for far too long.  That policy has encouraged speculation across the board, pushing up prices of property, equities and bonds.  The Fed has had a global effect since so many Asian countries have (formally or informally) linked their currencies to the dollar, keeping their interest rates low.  The Japanese central bank, by pumping money into the economy, may also have kept global bond yields down; Japanese private investors, faced with zero interest rates at home, have been chasing yield abroad.  Events should prove one or other of these explanations to be correct. On a couple of occasions this year, strong economic data have started to push bond yields higher, allowing the bond bears to claim victory. But each time, the data has come to an end in the face of weaker economic data or the perceived impact of high oil prices.  A collapsing housing market in the US, or an oil-induced recession in the west, would prove that bond markets have been right all along.  Alternatively, a Chinese currency revaluation, by reducing the need for Asian central banks to hold dollar securities, might send bond yields sharply higher.  As yet, none of the theories has been decisively proved correct. A lot of smart investors have been caught out as a consequence.  Many of them will be proved wrong again over the next 12 months.

译文:
    这一回，债券市场与其说是只老虎，还不如说是只猫。尽管许多政府已陷入赤字，但它们仍能以有史以来的低收益率(无论按实际还是名义价值)借贷。企业借贷成本与政府债券成本间的息差也非常小。

此外，债券收益率也未表现出与短期利率通常具有的历史关联。自2004年夏以来，美联储(US Federal Reserve)多次提高借贷成本。正常情况下，债券收益率会相应上涨，可是，这次它们几乎没有任何变化。

这给美联储出了一道难题。债券收益率是固定按揭利率的关键组成部分，与美国消费者密切相关。美联储所有货币紧缩措施的净效果，根本没有抬高按揭利率。难怪美国消费者一直在消费，房屋价格仍在一路攀升。

今年，美联储主席艾伦·格林斯潘(Alan Greenspan)将低水平的债券收益率称为一个“谜团”(conundrum)。很多投资者和策略师都会同意这一说法，他们当中许多人曾预测，美国债券收益率到2005年底将升至5%以上。

对于债券市场的奇怪反应，有很多可能的解释。第一个就是债券投资者仍然很精明，他们之所以购买低收益率债券，是因为他们相信，要么经济增长会停滞一段时间，要么经济即将陷入衰退。平坦或反向的收益率曲线(短期利率高于长期利率)，传统上被视为衰退的前兆。

这个解释的问题在于，鲜有经济学家预测会出现这样的衰退，股票市场对此似乎也并不担心。这要求人们信任聪明的债券投资者和愚钝的股票投资者，这两群人往往为相同的机构工作。

这一观点的某种变异形式称，债券市场根本没有发出有关经济增长的信号，它们只是反映了通胀。当今世界有亚洲的竞争，有瞄准通胀目标的各国央行，还有高新技术，不管增长前景如何，通胀率都将停留在低水平。因此，股票投资者大可放心，债券投资者可接受4%左右的收益率。

另一种解释是，债券收益率完全错了。摩根士丹利(Morgan Stanley)的大卫·迈尔斯(David Miles)估计，当时(9月份)一般水平的实际债券收益率，要求GDP年增长率一直保持在1.3%以下。而这种情况似乎不大可能。

债券收益率或许是被人为地保持在低水平。一种可能是全球储蓄过剩；过多储蓄资金在追逐过少的机会。储蓄的价格(债券收益率)因此降低。这种过度储蓄的“罪魁祸首”是亚洲人，特别是该地区的央行。
它们循环利用各自国家的经常账户盈余，使之转换成美元证券，压低了收益率水平。

另一种可能是，人口结构使债券收益率维持在低水平。Longview Economics的克里斯·沃特林(Chris Watling)指出，2000年以来，G7国家25至44岁年龄段的绝对人数一直在减少。
“这一年龄组展现最快的消费增长率，拥有多数首次购房者，并借贷大部分发给家庭的贷款。”

“因此，25至44岁年龄组的不断缩小，降低了需求的自然增长率。”

25至44岁年龄组的缩小必定会加快，尤其是在欧洲与日本。沃特林认为，消费增长将进一步放缓，而实际利率将在相当长一段时间里保持在低水平。

另一派人谴责美联储将宽松货币政策维持过久。

这种政策鼓励了各个领域的投机行为，拉高了房价、股价和债券价格。

由于许多亚洲国家(正式或非正式地)将它们的货币与美元挂钩，并保持低利率，所以美联储有着全球影响力。

日本央行向经济注入资金，可能也使全球的债券收益率保持在低水平。在本土面对零利率的日本投资者，也一直在海外追逐收益。

事实会证明，上述解释中总有一个是正确的。今年有两次，强劲的经济数据开始推动债券收益率上升，让看跌债券的人宣布胜利。但每次到最后，债券收益率都会在疲弱经济数据或高油价的影响下回跌。

假若美国房地产市场崩溃，或者高油价引发西方经济衰退，这些将证明债券市场终究是正确的。

又或者，如果中国升值人民币，减小亚洲各央行持有美元证券的需求，也可能令债券收益率大幅上升。

迄今为止，上述理论没有一个被令人信服地证明正确，令许多聪明的投资者陷入困境。

今后12个月，这些投资者中有许多将再次被证明错了。